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The flattening of the yield curve  
in the United States
The yield curve for US government debt securities has flattened significantly since late 2016 
and its slope, while positive, has fallen to levels not observed since before the global financial 
crisis. The inversion of the yield curve slope is considered, on occasions, as a leading 
indicator of future recessions. And this, given moreover that the current expansionary phase 
is proving more durable than previous upturns, has prompted debate on the implications of 
the recent flattening of the curve. However, as illustrated in this article, unlike previous 
episodes, in which the flattening of the curve was explained by the behaviour of the interest 
rates expected at different terms, at this current juncture it is warranted substantially by the 
compression of term premia. Against this background, the historical relationship between 
the yield curve and predicted recessions in the US economy might have altered.
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Since December 2016 the Federal Reserve has raised its policy interest rate by 100 bp and 
since October 2017 it has been gradually reducing the size of its balance sheet, ceasing to 
reinvest a portion of the maturing financial assets in its portfolio which were acquired 
during the quantitative easing programmes. This process of monetary normalisation and a 
communication policy geared to signalling further future rises in policy rates have led to 
increases in the shortest-dated market interest rates. However, the longest-dated interest 
rates have not increased by the same amount. Accordingly, the yield curve slope for US 
government securities has diminished, standing at levels not recorded since the months 
prior to the onset of the financial crisis. Given that, in recent decades, the episodes in 
which the slope of this curve turned negative – i.e. the longest-dated interest rates stood 
below their shorter-dated counterparts – were followed in most cases by a recession in the 
United States, the current reduction in the slope is prompting debate on its implications. 
This article focuses on analysing the matter. In this connection, the following section 
analyses the past predictive power of the yield curve slope and the changes therein in 
recent quarters. The third section breaks down government bond yields into their two main 
components: i) expectations about policy interest rates, and ii) the term premium, given 
that the source of the changes in the yield curve may be relevant for predicting the 
attendant implications. The fourth section discusses some of the factors – domestic and 
global alike – that might explain the recent developments in the term premium and 
condition future changes. Finally, the last section draws some brief conclusions. 
The yield curve for US government debt securities captures, at a given moment in time, the 
relationship between the yield1 on a broad set of US Treasury bonds (Treasuries) and the 
time remaining to their maturity. As these bonds are all issued by the Treasury, they have a 
similar default risk and are traded on the deepest and most liquid market in the world. This 
relationship is also known as the “term structure of interest rates”. Chart 1.1 depicts this 
curve at three different points in time, illustrating how its slope varies over time. If the 
interest rates on the securities are very similar, irrespective of their maturity, the curve is 
practically flat (March 2006); if short-term interest rates are higher than long-term rates, 
the curve has a negative slope (November 2006); but what is “normal” is that the curve 
should have a positive slope, i.e. short-term interest rates are lower than long-term rates, 
since the compensation for the passage of time demanded by investors is usually on a 
rising course: this is what is known as the “term premium”.2
As analysed below, the term premium is principally related to uncertainty over the future 
behaviour of the fundamental determinants of nominal interest rates: namely, inflation and 
the real short-term interest rate.3 Naturally, this uncertainty will be greater the longer the 
Introduction
Changes in the yield curve 
and its predictive power in 
respect of recessions in 
the United States
*  The authors appreciate the excellent technical support provided by Emilio Muñoz de la Peña.
1  To calculate these yields, both the coupons associated with the bond and their market price are taken into account. 
2  The curve may also evidence “humps”, indicating that certain intermediate terms have higher interest rates for 
liquidity and tax reasons, among others.
3  At certain points in time, other factors, such as the liquidity premium or credit risk, may take on greater 
significance. 
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term; accordingly, situations in which the curve has a negative (i.e. inverted) slope are 
considered as exceptional. 
The slope indicator most used is the spread between the yield on ten-year securities and 
that on short-term securities, with the most usual terms being three months, one year and 
two years.4 In particular, the spread calculated taking the two-year interest rate is that 
most frequently used, given the greater liquidity of the security, a desirable feature when 
compared with the ten-year security, which is also prominent in respect of its high liquidity. 
As can be seen in Chart 1.2, all these spreads are very closely interrelated.5
Chart 1.2 also shows how, since 1960, the US economy has undergone eight recessions, 
meaning that the country has been in recession 14.2% of the time. In all cases, the 
economy’s entry into recession was preceded by a yield curve negative slope situation, 
some months before. Moreover, only on one occasion, in late 19666, was there a false 
signal, i.e. a negative value for the slope that was not followed by the economy going into 
recession. As Table 1 shows, on the occasions on which the negative slope correctly 
augured a recession, the inversion of the curve came about, on average, 13 months before, 
except in the case of the recession following the global financial crisis, when the lead was 
22 months. Estrella and Hardouvelis (1991) demonstrated that the slope of the curve is a 
better predictor of recessions than other variables or indicators.7
In all instances, the inversion of the curve came about during episodes in which a 
restrictive monetary policy was being implemented (see Chart 2), in which nominal short-
term interest rates increased more than long rates. The increases in policy interest rates 
feed through to longer-dated interest rates, which are an average of the short-term 
interest rates expected in the future; nonetheless, when a restrictive monetary policy that 
reduces expected inflation is implemented, the policy interest rates expected in the 
SOURCES: Banco de España and Thomson-Reuters.
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4  It is common in the literature to use monthly averages of spreads, since the daily data may be somewhat erratic. 
5  The correlation coefficients between the three series are close to 0.9. 
6  In late 1998 it stood close to zero, but it did not ultimately invert. Some analysts also consider it a case of false 
positive. 
7  Estrella and Mishkin (1997) and Bernard and Gerlach (1998) show that this relationship also arises in other 
developed economies, such as Germany, Canada and the United Kingdom. 
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longest-dated terms also progressively fall. Moreover, restrictive monetary policy may 
contribute to reducing uncertainty by correcting potential imbalances in the economy, 
thereby compressing the term premium. In sum, long-term interest rates increase by a 
lesser amount than short rates, and, on some occasions, they may post falls (see Chart 3.1). 
Indeed, the pattern of behaviour of long-term interest rates is far from uniform in cycles 
of monetary restraint.
The current situation of the US economy is characterised by 120 consecutive months of 
growth to end-2017, far above the usual duration of expansionary phases, in a period in 
which the Federal Reserve has raised its policy interest rate by 100 bp since late 2016 and 
has begun the process of reducing the size of its balance sheet, through the non-
reinvestment of a portion of the maturing public debt securities and mortgage-backed 
securities (MBS) in its portfolio. In these circumstances, the slope of the yield curve 
(measured as the difference between the ten-year and two-year yields) has fallen by 75 bp 
since late 2016, to stand at around 50-60 bp (the historical average of this spread since the 
early 1960s has stood at 80 bp). 
SOURCE: Thomson-Reuters.
a Effective federal funds rate less core inflation.
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This has led some analysts and certain members of the Federal Open Market Committee 
(FOMC)8 to consider whether, if the reduction in the slope of the curve continues in the 
coming months, that might be indicative of the end of the expansion being closer.9 
Table 1 includes a column with the time interval observed between the point at which 
the slope of the curve stands at 50 bp and the point at which it turns negative in the 
curve-inversion episodes that are captured by the table.10 As can be seen, excluding 
the recessions that began in December 1969 and in March 2001, this interval is less 
than a year. 
  8  See the recent presentation by J. Bullard, Chairman of the Federal Reserve of Saint Louis (“Assessing the 
risk of yield curve inversion”, https://www.stlouisfed.org/~/media/Files/PDFs/Bullard/remarks/2017/
Bullard_Little_Rock_AR_1_ December_2017.pdf?la=en). See also Bauer and Mertens (2018), who point out 
that, in the current environment of low interest rates and term premia, the predictive power of the curve 
slope remains intact.
  9  In the euro area and in Japan, the slope of the curve has not fallen since late 2016, and in the United Kingdom 
the reduction has been on a lesser scale.
10  Only in mid-1984 did the curve slope stand close to current levels, without falling to the point of inverting, as 
can be seen in Chart 1. 
SOURCES: Banco de España, Thomson-Reuters and Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
a Difference in basis points in two- and ten-year rates in the months following the start of cycles compared with their level at the outset. The data for the previous 
cycles correspond in each month to the average of the values attained in the eight cycles started between November 1967 and June 2004.
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As Chart 3.2 shows, the reduction in the slope from late 2016 is chiefly in response to the 
increase in the two-year interest rate, which has stood at a peak from summer 2008. At the 
same time, the increase in the ten-year interest rate was on a lesser scale, something 
previously observed in the behaviour of this variable in the run-up to the financial crisis. 
The behaviour of the ten-year bond yield is pivotal since, if its course were due mainly to 
the greater demand for these bonds beyond macroeconomic factors (i.e. for structural or 
regulatory reasons, or in light of central banks’ exceptional policies), the slope of the curve 
would have lost some of its predictive power in respect of future recessions.11 In that case, 
the probabilistic models of the occurrence of recessions that include the curve slope12 as 
an explanatory factor would be overestimating that probability.13 The following section 
seeks precisely to identify the factors determining the movements in debt yields, since the 
implications in terms of the probability of recession differ depending on the factors that are 
most prominent.
The yields on government debt securities with a specific maturity can be broken down 
into: i) interest rate expectations, which show the expected path for the policy interest 
rates set by the Federal Reserve until the security matures, and ii) the term premium or the 
compensation to investors in exchange for the risk of holding bonds with a specific 
maturity in their portfolio, although, in practice, it includes all the factors other than the 
expectations component. These components are not observable, although the results of 
different decompositions are usually highly interrelated.14 Chart 3.3 depicts a potential 
decomposition15 of the yields on government debt securities at two and at ten years. 
As earlier noted, the power of yield curves to predict recessions is warranted because their 
inversion reflects an expectation that the policy interest rate will stand in the future below 
the expected short-term rate, as a result of the fact that the restrictive monetary policy at 
present will entail lower inflation and lower growth. In terms of the foregoing decomposition, 
the inversion of the slope should then stem from a negative spread between interest rate 
expectations for the ten-year and two-year terms, and not from the difference in premia 
between both terms. However, as was already discernible in Chart 3.3 and as can be 
clearly seen in Chart 3.4, in the current episode the rate expectations spread is holding at 
historically high levels, despite having fallen in recent years; conversely, the term premia 
spread between two- and ten-year securities is at a level close to its all-time low, which 
was reached in July 2016, and is even posting at certain times negative values. That is to 
say, investor demand has been for a similar (or even higher, at certain times) premium for 
continuing to hold bonds maturing at two and at ten years, which is an unusual behaviour 
in historical terms. 
In sum, in the current setting the flattening of the yield curve and its possible inversion 
would not be the outcome of expectations of lower nominal short-term interest rates in the 
future, but of a very narrow term premium spread, especially given the low value of the 
Decomposition of debt 
security yields 
11  Indeed, it is considered that the curve slope in the United Kingdom may have lost some of its predictive power 
owing to the high demand by institutional investors for longer-dated securities. Thus, for example, defined-
benefit pension funds, which are those that demand longer-dated assets, account for 96% of total UK pension 
funds, while in the United States they only represent 40%. See “Global Pension Asset Study”, published by Willis 
Waters Watson (https://www.willistowerswatson.com/en/insights/2017/01/global-pensionsasset-study-2017).
12  See at https://www.newyorkfed.org/medialibrary/media/research/capital_markets/Prob_Rec.pdf the model 
estimated by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
13  J. Yellen appeared to support this hypothesis at the press conference given after the FOMC’s December 2017 
meeting (https://www.federalreserve.gov/mediacenter/files/FOMCpresconf20171213.pdf ).
14  The decomposition by the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco can be found at http://www.federalreserve.
gov/pubs/feds/2006/200628/200628abs.html.
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term premium for the longer-dated maturities. Indeed, in the setting described, some 
analysts have proposed using the slope of the interest rate expectations component of the 
yield curve as an indicator of recessions, given that there are papers [Rosenberg and 
Maurer (2008)] that show a greater predictive power of this component than that of the 
yield curve itself. 
Such a low term premium, especially for the longer-dated maturities, may be due to various 
conditioning factors, such as holdings of US government debt securities by non-residents, 
the demand for these instruments as a safe asset, quantitative easing programmes or 
lower uncertainty over monetary policy, factors not linked necessarily to expectations 
about domestic macroeconomic developments. In the following section some of these 
factors are closely analysed. 
As indicated, the specific conditioning factors of term premia are the risk of inflation, the 
risk in respect of the future course of real short-term interest rates and other factors that 
affect the supply of and demand for public debt. These factors are difficult to identify at 
each point in time and, in practice, premia are estimated as a residual encompassing 
everything beyond the expectations component. 
This section analyses in detail the past and expected developments in the main factors 
affecting this premium, especially for the longer-dated terms, beginning with those relating 
to inflation risk and the future course of the real short-term rate. From an investor’s 
standpoint, the term premium is the additional yield demanded for holding long-term debt 
instead of acquiring short-term debt and progressively rolling it over. This additional yield 
is warranted by the risk to the investor entailed by the possibility that in the future the level 
of prices or the real short-term interest rate may increase more than expected. This risk 
increases commensurately with the maturity, meaning that the longer the debt security is 
held, the greater the compensation the investor demands and, therefore, the higher the 
term premium, thereby contributing to the curve slope being positive.
For example, higher inflation entails a loss of purchasing power for the public debt holder, 
both in terms of interest accrued and the principal, with the loss being all the greater the 
higher the inflation recorded until the bond’s maturity. Likewise, the investor may be 
adversely affected by holding long-term debt if the real short-term interest rate increases 
by more than expected, since the yield obtained on the long-term debt would be less than 
that the market would offer. If the risk of inflation is low, as it is currently considered to be 
for the developed countries, the inflation term premium should be low and might be lower 
for longer-dated maturities. It might even be the – extreme – case that this premium were 
negative in the event of a risk of deflation, since in that instance public debt would act as 
a hedging asset.16
The risk arising from the future course of the real short-term rate is related to the uncertainty 
over monetary policy and over the economy’s growth rate in the long term. Hence, during 
periods in which the monetary authority’s communication is not clear, the premium tends 
The flattening of the curve 
and the term premium: 
what has changed? 
DETERMINANTS OF THE TERM 
PREMIUM
15  Decomposition by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, which can be found at https://www.newyorkfed.org/
research/data_indicators/term_premia.html.
16  In a deflationary context, generally related to low-growth situations, public debt provides a hedging instrument 
for an investor’s portfolio, since it increases the investor’s purchasing power at a time when other assets, such 
as equities, might lose value. Fuertes and Gimeno (2017) calculate the probability of deflation for the United 
States and the euro area on the basis of inflation options and swaps. This probability stood in mid-2017 at 
around 5% in the United States.
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to rise, and by a greater amount the longer the term is, as may have been the case during 
the episode known as the “taper tantrum” in 2013.17 On the contrary, if communication of 
monetary policy decisions is made transparently and clearly, that will contribute to the 
term premium being low. The publication of the FOMC’s projections about the course of 
the federal funds rate, as from 2012, may thus have contributed to reducing the premium, 
by lessening the uncertainty over monetary policy and improving its communication. 
The term premium is affected by other factors besides inflation risk and the risk in 
respect of the course of the real short-term rate; these include most notably those 
relating to public debt supply and demand, which may explain in part the current low 
level of term premia and the changes therein for the different terms. The supply and 
demand factors affect the slope of the curve in terms of the maturity of the public debt 
being bought or sold. If, for example, there is demand for a greater volume of long-term 
rather than short-term debt, the slope of the curve falls. The most significant factors 
from this standpoint include:
— Quantitative easing (QE) programmes. These programmes were implemented 
by the Federal Reserve from December 2008 to October 2014, with purchases 
of different types of assets being made, including long-term government 
debt.18 Various research papers associate the QE programmes with the decline 
in the long-term government debt yield [D’Amico et al. (2012), D’Amico and 
King (2013) and Engen et al. (2015), inter alia]. In one of the latest papers [Bonis 
et al. (2017)], published by the Federal Reserve, it is estimated that the term 
premium on US ten-year government debt in December 2016 had declined by 
100 bp owing to the cumulative effect of the QE programmes, and this effect is 
projected to disappear only very gradually over the coming years as a 
consequence of the fall in the average maturity of the Federal Reserve’s asset 
portfolio and of the partial cessation of reinvestment initiated in October 2017.
— Holdings of US long-term government debt by non-residents: the purchases of 
US public debt by non-residents have been another argument used to explain 
the low current level of the term premium. Indeed, this is not new, and it was 
previously argued that during the previous period of rises in policy rates by the 
Federal Reserve, from 2004 to 2006, entailing a 425 bp increase in the 
benchmark rate, holdings of public debt by non-residents could have been the 
cause of the scant movement in long-term interest rates, which was known as 
Greenspan’s conundrum (named after the Federal Reserve chairman during 
those years). 
— Demand for US government debt as a safe asset: this factor complements the 
previous one, since a portion of non-residents’ purchases of long-term US 
debt is due to the need to include this type of safe asset in their portfolios. 
Moreover, there is a demand for long-term assets by insurers and pension 
funds which, in a large proportion, is channelled towards public debt purchases. 
17  In May 2013, the erstwhile Chairman of the Federal Reserve, Ben Bernanke, announced the likely tapering of 
asset purchases by the Federal Reserve at the end of that year. This unexpected announcement meant that 
many investors also brought forward their expectations of a rise in the policy rate, prompting an increase in the 
yield on public debt. 
18  Between 2008 and 2014 the Federal Reserve engaged in three rounds of large-scale asset purchases and 
implemented a maturity-extension programme, resulting in a total volume of purchases of $4.5 trillion and an 
increase in the duration of the portfolio on the Federal Reserve’s balance sheet from 5.2 to 5.9 years. 
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The new regulatory requirements in the banking sector may also have 
increased the demand for US public debt, since such debt is treated 
preferentially by the regulations on capital requirements and liquidity. This is 
all against a background of growing scarcity of safe assets in the global 
economy [see, for example, Caballero and Fahri (2017)]. This demand by the 
banking sector would reduce the term premium if long-term debt were 
purchased, but the effect on the yield curve slope is not clear, since for the 
slope to flatten there would have to be a bias towards longer- rather than 
shorter-dated debt purchases. 
— Monetary policy externalities: the different monetary policy cycles in the main 
developed areas may affect the relative demand for public debt in each country. 
Thus, for instance, the current circumstances may be conducive towards higher 
demand for US public debt at the expense of Japanese or euro area debt, 
whose monetary policy cycles are lagging and where interest rates are lower. 
With a view to the future, it is important to question whether the tendency of the yield curve 
to flatten will continue, to the point of potentially inverting, or whether, on the contrary, 
such flattening will reverse because long-term rates react to a greater extent to rises in the 
federal funds rate and/or to the reduction in the Federal Reserve’s balance sheet. 
Once again, an attempt to answer this question can be made looking at the decomposition 
of the yield on government debt. On one hand, the expectations component of the curve 
would increase its slope if long-term expectations about the inflation level or the real short-
term-term interest rate were to increase. The FOMC’s projections do not suggest either of 
these two scenarios will occur, since long-term inflation expectations appear to be 
anchored at 2% and the long-term projections about the real neutral federal funds rate19 
have been revised downwards in recent years. In any event, any shock that were to 
increase expectations about the natural interest rate would be conducive to increasing the 
slope of the curve. 
It is also possible to identify scenarios in which the spread between the longer-dated and 
the shorter-dated risk premia increases.20 Some of these possible scenarios would be the 
following:
— Inflation risk: currently, the inflation risk is low, but any change or shock that were 
to make it increase might feed through to increases in the inflation risk premium. 
Thus, for example, the recent tax cut and the increase in discretionary federal 
public spending approved in the United States might prompt inflationary pressures. 
— Change in expectations about the Federal Reserve’s monetary policy: one of 
the arguments used to explain why the reduction in the Federal Reserve’s 
balance sheet, which began last October, has not impacted long-term yields is 
because a very gradual process is expected and because any change will be 
CAN THE YIELD CURVE BE 
EXPECTED TO CONTINUE 
FLATTENING?
19  The real neutral federal funds rate is defined as the real interest rate that would prevail under circumstances 
considered as equilibrium conditions from the macroeconomic stabilisation standpoint (GDP, inflation, etc.). 
See Galesi et al. (2017).
20  Another possible scenario might be that in which, for financial stability reasons, the Federal Reserve were to 
continue raising policy interest rates by a greater amount than the markets had discounted or if it were even to 
accelerate the process and thereby prompt corrections on the financial markets and flights to quality, with 
reductions once again in term premia. 
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communicated clearly by the Federal Reserve. If this were not the case and 
there were surprises or uncertainty over this process, or in general over 
monetary policy and the pace of increase of interest rates, for example, as a 
consequence of the above-mentioned fiscal impulse, term premia might 
increase and do so to a greater extent for longer-dated premia. 
— Increase in Treasury debt issues: the above-mentioned ongoing reduction in the 
Federal Reserve’s balance sheet, and the prospect of higher fiscal deficits and 
tax cuts, augurs an increase in the Treasury’s financing needs. That would entail 
the issuance of more debt, which might lead to an increase in the yield on the 
maturities at which the instruments are issued. In the latest report by the Treasury 
Borrowing Advisory Committee (TBAC)21, it was advised covering a substantial 
portion of the growing financing needs with Treasury bills, which are debt 
securities with a maturity of less than one year. It was also proposed issuing at 
terms of between two and five years, while it was advised against increasing very 
long-dated issues since the average maturity is already far higher than those in 
the past. If these recommendations continue to be met, the new issues might 
continue to be conducive to a greater flattening of the yield curve. If, on the 
contrary, long-term debt were preferentially issued22, the slope might increase. 
— Reduction in non-residents’ holdings of US public debt: the volume of US public 
debt held by non-residents has increased considerably since 2008, rising from 
$2.35 trillion at end-2007 to $6.24 trillion in November 2017 (see Chart 4). This 
volume accounts for around 31% of total public debt and 42% of debt held by 
the public.23 Moreover, most of this debt is long-term24, which might prompt 
increases in long-term interest rate yields if non-residents decide to sell a 
sufficient amount of such debt. In a setting in which other countries are capable 
of producing sufficiently safe assets, the demand for US assets might shift. 
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21  https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/current_TBACReportPressRelease.aspx.
22  This is not currently the case: for example, on 31 January the U.S. Treasury announced a $2 billion-per-month 
increase for each of the auctions of debt maturing at two and at three years; and a $1 billion-per-month increase 
for all auctions of long-term debt (maturities at five, seven, ten and thirty years). 
23  Debt held by the public accounts for the portion of government debt that has not been purchased by government 
agencies. The Federal Reserve’s holdings are included in the debt held by the public. 
24  In November 2017, the volume of Treasury bills (instruments that mature at less than one year) held by non-
residents was $340 billion, while the volume of debt maturing at over one year was $3.72 trillion. The sum of 
these two amounts is not the total debt held by non-residents, since there is a portion of this debt about which 
maturity-related information is not released.
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— Change in the monetary policy of other developed areas: if the normalisation 
of monetary policies begins in other areas, such as Japan and the euro area, 
US public debt would cease to be so attractive in relative terms and the 
demand for it would fall. 
The flattening of the US government debt yield curve is prompting an intense debate 
(inside and outside the Federal Reserve), owing to the power attributed to this curve in 
predicting periods of recession in the past. This article argues that the factors that have 
influenced the current flattening are different from those of past periods, such that the 
inversion of the curve might not be anticipating a recession. Specifically, the decomposition 
of the government debt yield into the expectations component and the term premium 
shows how, in previous periods, an inverted yield curve reflected expectations of a future 
decline in the policy rate, in line with prospects of low inflation and lower growth. 
Conversely, in the current setting, expectations of increases in the policy interest rate 
remain in place, while term premia are very low, especially those for the longer-dated 
maturities, this being a considerable differential factor compared with the past. In any 
event, if the yield curve were to invert, albeit for reasons other than those observed on 
previous occasions, and this were to have an adverse effect on agents’ confidence, the 
situation would pose a further communication challenge to the Federal Reserve.
The main factors behind the current course of term premia are the quantitative easing 
programmes implemented by the Federal Reserve, non-resident demand for debt 
securities and monetary policy externalities. Moreover, other conditioning factors, such as 
the low risk of inflation or the lower uncertainty over monetary policy, may also have 
contributed here. 
Against this background, various factors might have been instrumental in leading the level of 
term premia to normalise, thereby preventing any further tendency of the curve to flatten. Thus, 
for example, positive inflation surprises, greater uncertainty over the course of US monetary 
policy, a reduction in non-residents’ holdings of US long-term government debt and the 
increase in US long-term debt issues would contribute to raising the yield on long-term debt 
securities, thereby increasing the slope of the curve. From that standpoint, the fiscal stimulus 
approved in the United States in recent months might be another trigger for the increase. 
Data cut-off date: 1.3.2018
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